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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

THE RELATIONS OF SCIENCE AND DEMOCRACY

THE question of the relation of science and democracy has become a social issue in the contemporary world. It is not a purely theoretical matter since its answer determines or expresses social policy in fields of morals, education, and politics. Hence the clarification of the problem is of considerable importance.

There is a strong current tendency to deny any connection between science and democracy. Science is regarded as a neutral instrument, a tool capable of opposite uses, as a drug may kill or cure. In this view democracy embodies values which must be grounded elsewhere, whether in intuition, authority, religion, or even arbitrary preference. A corollary of this approach is that scientific method has little rôle in the field of values, and that the long march of science over the ages will not carry it far beyond the limits of the physical world. This view finds support in traditional practice. The engineer exercises his profession within the scope of orders given to him by those who decide what is to be constructed. And if the doctor has been thought to be irrevocably committed to health as a goal, not death, this belief has been rudely shattered by the part medical science has played in Nazi massacre chambers.

The assertion of an intimate connection between science and democracy means that science is somehow by its very nature committed to democracy, that its expansion beyond the physical domain to the studies of man brings a growing knowledge of the human good, and that accordingly scientific propositions may be asserted to provide directions of social policy for mankind. Hence in the treatment of values no special resort to non-scientific foundations is required. One does not need a religious or dogmatic basis for democracy, nor is the selection of democracy purely a "matter of taste."

The crystallization of the issue between these opposing views requires a more explicit conception of both science and democracy, for each of these is a complex of constituent elements, and reference may be either to the whole or to some of the parts. Science in

its narrowest sense may be taken as purely a method of hypothesis, verification, and the development of stable knowledge, together with the totality of such existent knowledge at a given time. In a somewhat wider and more usual sense "science" refers not merely to reliance on the method plus acquired knowledge, but also to the whole enterprise of increasing human knowledge in as many fields as possible. This, in effect, incorporates into the conception of science the value commonly known as "love of truth," one to which, in the popular tradition, the detached unemotional scientist is supposed to subordinate everything else. In a still wider and historical sense, science may be understood as the self-conscious advance-guard of the whole human enterprise, aiming at the increase of knowledge and control whereby the mass of mankind may achieve their aims with growing success. For purposes of reference let us speak of these three meanings of "science" as:

Science I—method plus established knowledge.
Science II—I plus the continuous search for extended truth.
Science III—II as the vanguard of the systematic pursuit of human goals.

In similar fashion "democracy" refers to a cluster of constituent elements. There are, in the first place, the *goals* of democracy, epitomized in such ideals as liberty, equality, fraternity. These should be taken in a positive sense rather than a negative one. Thus liberty means not the mere absence of certain restraints but the existence of the positive conditions requisite in a given age for the achievement of the broad aims of mankind. Equality goes beyond the removal of the major discriminations and becomes the establishment of widespread opportunities for all. Fraternity begins as a coöperative relationship of individuals but does not end there; the brotherhood of man achieves a practical meaning as the unity of the globe and the reckoning of the good in terms of two billion people. The goals of democracy become thus the widest achievement of the aims of men.

In the second place there are the *techniques* of democracy. In spite of the conflicting forces that entered into the history of political democracy, and the many controversies that have raged around representative government, in spite of the opaqueness of such symbols as "the general will" and "the social contract," a fairly rounded picture emerges of the underlying principles of "government of the people, by the people, for the people." It implies a group with some initial interest in their common problems, willing to "make a go of it," attempting to stimulate in its own members the widest consciousness of the effort to live a common

life and the widest participation in its fashioning, striving to remove any special obstacles in the way of participation, supporting the variety of men's aims, and fashioning attitudes and objectives which will minimize the need for compulsion. In these terms such different features as, for example, "one man, one vote," an independent judiciary, and the use of the referendum, seek their justification.

There are, in the third place, the *attitudes* of democracy, the character-traits which enable us to say of an individual that he is a democratic man. It is the kind of picture that Pericles, for example, draws of Athenian character in his Funeral Speech reported by Thucydides. That attitudes are an essential component of democracy has become evident in the present war in the contrast of the bases of American and German morale.

It is interesting to note that the three phases of democracy here referred to correspond to the three types of problems in ethical theory—goals to the good, principles of government to the right and rules of obligation, and character and attitudes to virtues. For the purposes of reference let us speak of these three meanings of "democracy" as:

Democracy I—goals and ideals.
Democracy II—principles of government.
Democracy III—character-traits and attitudes.

Clearly, a full conception of democracy embodies them all in an integrated pattern, but this is not always true of current usage of the term in controversies concerning the relation of science and democracy.

Science I

Science I has, strictly speaking, no necessary relation to Democracy I. Mere use of scientific method plus existent knowledge commits one to no democratic goals. There would be, to take an extreme case, no inconsistency in an attempt by the use of scientific method to wipe out the greater part of human knowledge and minimize the use of scientific method in the world. We may leave it to the counter-Utopian novelists to picture the havoc of such a conspiracy.

Science I has an instrumental relation to Democracy II. There is an obvious use for the knowledge and method of the physical and social sciences in achieving the successful operations of democratic government. The voting machine, the radio, statistical techniques, educational theory, the scientific analysis of prejudice and propaganda, and a host of other contributions are only the beginning of

what science may do to increase the participation of men in the determination of social policy. It must be recognized, however, that as an instrument Science I has also proved useful for the enslavement of men in Nazi dictatorship.

The relation of Science I to Democracy III is, on the other hand, one of marked similarity. Democracy can readily be compared to science in the attitudes that both require. Both require coöperativeness and some respect for others' views. There is in both a general approach in terms of probability rather than necessity: no hypothesis, no proposal is ultimate and authoritative; it must be tested for the success of its operation; the divine right of kings with its assumption of absolute power is no more acceptable to democracy than self-evident unprovable assertions or innate ideas with their assumption of absolute truth are to science.[1] This initial tentativeness involves a positive receptivity rather than an emotional intolerance to new ideas. A scientific hypothesis is judged by its scientific fruits in the progress of knowledge, a social policy by its practical fruits in achieving the aims of men. The criticism of assumptions in science is matched by the criticism of aims in democracy. The experimental outlook of science has as its counterpart a serious attitude to ideas in society—they are to be regarded as maps for incipient action, not as cheap talk. The coöperative element in the growth of science can be matched by the coöperative discussion and comparison of various lines of social policy. The imaginative element in initiation of scientific ideas has as its democratic counterpart the exercise of initiative. In a democracy there is no excuse for having a good idea and not starting it off in some channel of coöperative consideration and action. Merely to say "Somebody ought to do such-and-such" is to reveal an attitude inimical to the maintenance of democracy. Finally, just as in science change is expected and its consequences are carried through in other areas of knowledge, so democracy requires an acceptance of change as normal and an expectation that any change may have effects in areas other than the one in which it came about. It requires also a readiness to assume coöperatively the burdens of such change.

This parallelism of the attitudes of democracy and science is perhaps no accidental one. It suggests that in one sense democracy may be viewed as the extension of scientific method and scientific attitudes to human life. But such an hypothesis carries us beyond Science I.

[1] It is interesting to note the parallelism in Locke's writings between the attack on innate ideas in Book I of *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* and the attack on the divine right of kings in Book I of his *Of Civil Government*.

Science II

If we add to the definition of science as the use of scientific method and the possession of scientific knowledge a love of truth which seeks an extension of scientific knowledge in all fields, are we then committed to democracy in its various senses? Certainly we are committed to the kind of society in which knowledge will flourish. Now is a democracy better equipped than any other to further scientific progress? This is not a question to be resolved *a priori*. We must ask whether, for example, a slave society or a paternalistic society through the efforts of an élite of Platonic guardians might not as well or better advance scientific knowledge. But to acknowledge that a connection is not necessary *a priori* is not the same as to deny that a connection exists. The question of the relations of Science II and democracy is a question for the social and historical sciences to answer. And while a detailed examination of the evidence bearing on this question would be out of place in this brief mapping of the problem, the trend of pertinent evidence is quite clear.

The history of the growth of knowledge and the growth of democracy shows no immediate or simple correlation. It is true that in its origins in the ancient world much of scientific knowledge was the achievement of special priestly groups and special guilds whose social position was that of privileged groups. On the other hand it may be claimed with some reason that this special position hindered the advance of certain fields of knowledge and turned science toward mysticism and dogmatism. In the growth of western civilization, however, when the industrial and commercial classes released tremendous productive forces in their rise to power, science and political freedom were clearly associated. Now with the promise of abundance there is certainly reason to associate the most rapid extension of knowledge with the widest extension of opportunity, that is, of democratic goals.

Even this intimate relationship between Science II and Democracy I must not be assumed by definition. It is true that positive equality as a democratic goal means wide opportunities for all to achieve human aims. But what reason is there to believe that growth of knowledge will be prominent among these aims? The answer here would follow at least three lines. In the first place, the intimate relation of technology and abundance, and in turn of theory and technology, ensures a basic hold for the sciences irrespective of their special inclusion as a separate human aim. Whatever else knowledge is, it is power. In the second place, most attempts to thwart scientific growth have in the past come from

special interests that feared elimination of their special irrational bases; the removal of their political power in a whole-hearted democracy would be at least an indirect benefit to science. A more positive relation may be expected since democracy has most to gain from growing science. In the third place, the contemptuous picture of mankind which assigns no place for the pursuit of knowledge in the catalogue of its aims emerges on historical investigation as itself an aristocratic conception fashioned to justify aristocratic privilege and human serfdom. A Jeffersonian faith in the people, not as radical romanticism but as a sober scientific judgment is presupposed in the empirical establishment of the connection of Science II and Democracy I. The vast resources of leadership in the people have become amply clear in the experiences of the present war both in battle and on the home front. It is becoming almost a commonplace of social psychology that no vast enterprise—and modern complex enterprises are all vast—can succeed without releasing the widest initiative of its participants. This is as true of the miracle of American war production as it is of the miracle of Russian or Chinese guerilla warfare. And current realistic planning for the rapid expansion of American education represents the recognition that social progress, of which scientific progress is a central part, can not rest on the shoulders of a few. Hence the whole-hearted commitment to the growth of knowledge, since it calls for the society in which science may attain its fullest stature, turns out on empirical grounds to imply commitment to democratic goals.

Does it also imply commitment to political democracy, Democracy II? I think that it does. But this again is offered not as a logical consequence but as a scientific discovery. It represents the lesson of experience that the techniques of paternalism or of benign dictatorship do not on the whole succeed in the widest achievement of democratic goals and hence of the greatest support for and growth in knowledge. It is, of course, possible to argue *a priori* that, given equal opportunities, *except political*, for all men, more energy will go into scientific fields in a political aristocracy than in a political democracy. But this assumes that such conditions can come about. The defender of political democracy can muster considerable evidence for the following propositions: (*a*) Where political democracy is lacking there is an almost inevitable entry of privilege and exploitation, hence of inequality and the loss of democratic goals. (*b*) In our complex modern world any aristocracy will make more mistakes than a political democracy, especially since its actions are not subject to widespread preliminary scrutiny of policy. (*c*) Where political democracies have in

fact failed to achieve democratic goals the trouble has been insufficient political democracy in the sense of insufficiently developed participation by the people (e.g., in not bothering to vote and allowing reactionary office-holders to be reëlected and to control democratic machinery). More important than these three points, however, is the fact that there is no longer (if there ever was) any separate domain of politics. Political democracy therefore means now the use of such decision-techniques as will achieve the widest participation of the people in all the variety of human enterprises from economic life to education and scientific inquiry. It is not identified with any one special machinery of representation.

The connection of Science II and democratic attitudes (Democracy III) follows as a corollary. For Democracy III refers to the very attitudes and character-traits that experience shows suitable for achievement of democratic goals and essential to successful political democracy.

Science III

If we take science to be itself one phase of the enterprise of life—the whole phase of knowledge and control, then we can not separate science and democracy. For all that is requisite to translate the commitment to science into one for democracy is to discover that an integrated pattern of democratic goals, democratic techniques, and democratic attitudes is the form of life in which the enterprise of life and the achievement of human aims is best carried on. On this approach the relation of Science III to Democracy I is discoverable *a priori*. For science here involves the widest control in the achievement of human aims, and democratic goals as defined yield the same result.

There remains, however, the problem of the assumption that there is a common human enterprise and that we may think in terms of common human aims. Those who feel the need for a non-scientific foundation for democracy tend at precisely this point to identify science with an ultimate individualistic relativism from which any transition to common aims is purely a matter of chance. Those who would use science as a basis for democracy are thus faced with a choice between acquiescing in some non-scientific principle or resting their case on pure chance, much as in the history of religious controversy the opponents of the design argument were faced with the choice of surrender or a belief in a fortuitous concourse of "blind atoms."

This analogy also indicates the direction of solution. Just as the evolutionary position provided an intermediate path in which contingency did not mean bare chance and in which development

hammered out patterns without initial design, so the unity of men's aims needs no supra-human non-scientific basis. Whether men have common aims, and what, if any, they are, are questions for scientific scrutiny. It need not be maintained that they always had them, or that they were always really "there" when they were not discoverable, except in the sense that retrospectively we may see that had they developed more rapidly there might have been a readier solution for men's problems.[2] But it is clear enough today that the aims of men of all lands converge in spite of established differences and entrenched rivalries, that they are common not merely in the sense that by and large men want the same kinds of things but also in the sense that they can achieve them only by the same path of international coöperation and increased productivity, industrialization, democracy, and education. The idea that because every man might *a priori* have a different opinion, therefore any unanimity that exists is purely chance, is either the profound metaphysical error of thinking that all existential connections must be logical to be real, or else the mere sophomoric flaunting of the idea of relativity.

Once the assumption of common aims is well grounded, the relation of Science III and Democracy I follows necessarily. The relation of Science III to Democracy II and III is then empirically discoverable along the lines examined in dealing with Science II, but more readily since we are dealing with all broad human aims, not merely with the extension of knowledge.

Converse Relations

Up to this point we have asked only when a commitment to science brings with it a commitment to democracy. It is appropriate also to examine the converse problem. This may be done somewhat summarily in the light of the previous exploration.

Democracy I, the achievement of democratic goals, would seem to require reliance on science in all three senses. This is scientifically discoverable. Without the sciences as bodies of knowledge, material progress, upon which rests the achievement of democratic goals, would be impossible. Without incorporating the extension of knowledge as a major aim, social progress remains unstable. Without regarding the scientific enterprise as a major element in the whole human enterprise the fullest achievement of democratic goals is handicapped. And finally, no other method

[2] This is a presentation of the minimum claim. It does not preclude the stronger position of common human aims as always existent but obscured through lack of knowledge and lack of resources. The substantiation of such claim is, of course, also a matter of analysis and scientific investigation.

than that of science proves comparably reliable. There remains only the question whether such other method used as supplementary is required by a commitment to democracy. That it is not required would follow from the previous recognition that a commitment to Science II and III involves a commitment to Democracy I. But this need not hinder some men from deriving their democratic faith in part from religious premises.

Democracy II, as we have seen, finds scientific knowledge a useful tool. If political democracy be taken in its narrowest sense as purely a technique, then the belief in its use may rest on several different theories; thus the believer in such political democracy is not necessarily committed to a broad scientific outlook. Nevertheless it is probably true that even such narrowly conceived political democracy would achieve its fullest development and stability in connection with Science II and III. This is even more clearly the case if political democracy be linked to democratic goals.

Democracy III is related to Science I by similarity of attitudes, as we have seen. Its relation to Science II and III is probably that where they prevail we find the best soil for the development of democratic attitudes.

Conclusions

It follows from the above map of the various relations of the various senses of "science" and "democracy" that there is no simple answer to the oversimplified question of their connection or independence. A few general conclusions do, however, emerge:

(1) If science is reduced to a narrow method, then it becomes by that act a neutral instrument. But there is no reason why science should be so narrowly construed. The treatment of science as merely Science I corresponds neither with common usage, which rarely thinks of science as finished or unconcerned with its development, nor with philosophic usage which generally stresses the psychological and social conditions of scientific progress. We may doubt whether even those who regard science as unrelated to democracy are using this narrowest sense; more likely they are coupling it with an ethic of individualistic relativism which they mistakenly take to be implied in the "detached" character of the method. More often the treatment of science as neutral is either an attempt to shed social and ethical responsibility, or else an effort to restrict the possible efficacy of science.

(2) If democracy is reduced to a narrow political technique, then it loses any relation to wider purposes. This narrow use is much more common than a narrow use of "science." It is sup-

ported by the attempt to keep democratic techniques within the limited confines of "politics"; notably it has stemmed from opponents of the extension of democracy to economic problems. But such a narrow conception of democracy is corrected, at the very least, by a study of the history, growth, and vicissitudes of political democracy itself. There is no reason why any responsible investigation in social philosophy today should be content with anything less than an integrated conception of democracy embodying all three phases.

(3) As between Science II and Science III, the former is clearly the most common sense of the term "science." The latter may, however, grow as a result of the growth of knowledge and of social clarification. For what is seen in terms of the individual's activity and motivation as an effort to apply scientific method and expand knowledge may become more generally viewed as the historian describes such phases of life—as part of the collective effort of people to resolve human problems in the light of fundamental human needs, experimenting over long periods of time with institutions and social forms, learning with faltering steps and often at great cost.

(4) Since science is not usually, and democracy should not be, narrowly construed, the fairest conclusion is that there is a clear interrelation between them. The former provides a basis and a method for the latter; the latter is best achieved by reliance on the former. Such connections are not weakened but strengthened when they are seen as an outcome of empirical inquiry rather than of facile definition, when they are seen as the implication of human hopes rather than as fiat of human caprice, when they are seen as indispensable conditions of human success rather than as the mandates of dogma.

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BOOK REVIEW

KIERKEGAARD IN LIMBO [1]

APPARENTLY many philosophers learn their psychology when young and forget it as they grow older. There is ancient precedent for this narrowing of interest. It was a Plato full of psychological vision who commenced a *Republic,* and one who, in some respects, had tired of this spirited quest who wrote the *Laws.* Whenever new questions about human nature fail to come to mind, and old opinions become hardened battle cries, it is time to recognize a breakdown of inquiry. Some recent literature acknowledges this fact with reference to the fields of art, morals, and religion. Yet only a few thus far fully recognize how the genuinely objective and relativistic change which has taken place in some branches of psychology in the past decade or so may contribute to their inquiries, and one is impressed with the fact that, broadly conceived, most of these are sociologists. Søren Kierkegaard hardly comes to mind as an objective relativist in the fields of art, morals, and religion, yet in this respect his most youthful writing displays a conception of the human personality which was uniquely foresighted. If, as some feel, he later fell from his highest insight and failed to embody fully the nature of his discoveries, this fact may not wholly destroy his importance for us. The recent publication of an English translation of *Either/Or,* originally brought out in 1843 and his first great claim to literary fame, calls for evaluation of the work from the standpoint of a present as well as historical perspective. Here we find an interest in the genuine relationship between art, morals, and self-understanding which

[1] *Either/Or. A Fragment of Life.* SØREN KIERKEGAARD. Volume I, translated by David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson. Volume II, translated by Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press. London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1944. vii + 387 pp.; xvi + 304 pp. $7.50.

Other translations of Kierkegaard published in 1944 by the Princeton University Press, and in London by Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, are the following:

For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourselves! and Three Discourses, 1851. Translated, with an Introduction and Notes, by Walter Lowrie. vii + 243 pp. $2.50.

Training in Christianity and the Edifying Discourse Which 'Accompanied' It. Translated, with an Introduction, by Walter Lowrie. xxvii + 275 pp. $3.00.

The Concept of Dread. Translated, with Introduction and Notes, by Walter Lowrie. xiii + 154 pp. $2.00.

Attack upon "Christendom," 1854–1855. Translated, with an Introduction and Notes, by Walter Lowrie. xviii + 303 pp. $2.50.

may be viewed as a contribution to a humanistic, anti-speculative, empirical, and psychologically realistic philosophy of man. Kierkegaard may never have furthered or even equalled these earliest insights. Here, at any rate, he advances a functional point of view; he is intent upon showing what the good and beautiful and true are, not as things apart from man, but in terms of operations of the whole personality. He presents, as he prefers to call it, a new "immanent teleology" of the personality. There is evidence that, however fragmentary his inquiry, these insights now assume a relevance which they did not have in his own day and perhaps could not have had until the development of the psychology of personality matured through and beyond the directive influence of Freud. For while Freud's substantial contributions of unconscious motivation, anxiety, and transference are alive today, though greatly altered, subsequent inquiries have yielded far more humanistic, non-speculative, empirical, and realistic emphases, aspects of which were forced upon a sensitive Kierkegaard by his own youthful and exuberant experiences.

In the two volumes of *Either/Or* Kierkegaard set down, in a series of loosely related essays and sketches, what he considered to be the fundamental differences and possible relationships between the esthetic and the ethical ways of life. Here we find none of the theological dialectic which has appealed to so surprisingly large an audience today. This work reflects two important occasions in the author's early life. The first was his broken engagement to Regina Olsen. It is fitting that the theme of the work is the meaning of love in its self-destructive and self-constructive aspects; for the elaboration of this theme he ranges from Greek tragedy to the music of Mozart and the plays of Scribe. The second important occasion was an industrious search for a philosophic position which could explain to him the meaning of his life in a way wherein Hegel, and idealism generally, had failed. For the latter purpose he had gone to Berlin, where he was engaged, as he says, in "writing out Schelling's lectures." From Schelling he evidently received much stimulus despite the fact that later, like many who attended the famous Berlin lectures, he repudiated such help. The struggles through which he was passing may have left their marks in the work here and there where the thought is incoherent or the style ineffective. The reader may find Kierkegaard arguing repetitiously, as if the author wanted thereby to make sure of his own insight. Yet despite the distance of time and temper, anyone who completes the two volumes will feel that he has made something of a pilgrimage of soul through the extremes of an "exuberant joy of life" and the moral imperatives which are never

quite convincing enough to be categorical. Without benefit of clergy, one might say, Kierkegaard was searching for that emotional and intellectual security which could be at once esthetic and moral. In the face of Christian moralism and Romantic reaction, he sought a new union of what had been so largely separated since ancient Greek culture. That later he was to find a different perspective within Christianity is, of course, foreshadowed in this work. Yet one gets the impression that his solution at this time stands entirely outside of any consciously accepted tradition, and the concluding pages, which hint at the third and final stage, the religious, introduce a theme which seems to jar with the major emphasis throughout the rest of the work.

To put it briefly, Kierkegaard contrasts the esthetic and ethical ways of life, the former in terms of a restless longing for that outside the self which may satisfy and bring some peace and harmony to life, the latter in terms of the self-sufficiency of the personality, its creativity and its social nature. The former is explained in the first volume through a variety of media, including aphorisms, an extended analysis of Mozart's *Don Juan* and a general treatment of music, a comparison of ancient with modern tragedy with emphasis on the character of Antigone, a series of what might be called subjective portraits, an essay on Scribe's *The First Love,* some briefer essays, and finally a long-winded but ingenious section entitled "Diary of the Seducer." The second volume is written with more directness and less appealing literary style, if from a translation one can judge anything of the original. It treats the ethical way of life first in terms of a refutation of the argument that the moral (in this case marriage, which may be understood, I believe, to stand for the social nature of man) is unesthetic, then in terms of the "equilibrium between the aesthetical and the ethical in the composition of personality." The latter, a section of some hundred and fifty pages, will be especially illuminating for those seeking a brief, first-hand introduction to Kierkegaard's philosophic intentions. Here the thought and style are clearest and most direct, and the way in which Kierkegaard selected his materials from his cultural context will interest the historian of ideas as well as those seeking to understand Kierkegaard's possible contribution to psychiatry. Whether or not the author has achieved a satisfying, stable union of the moral and esthetic ways of life in modern Western culture is, of course, open to many doubts. That he has recorded afresh a perennial quest and presented many suggestive observations is beyond doubt, as I wish to show.

The restlessness and resultant despair of the purely esthetic way of life—assuming there could be such—is conceived as arising

in a type of desire for which satisfaction is never possible. The general theme of Kierkegaard's "either/or" applies to the decision between esthetic concealment of one's self and ethical self-realization. But the term "either/or" seems also to apply to the incessant shifting of objects and perspective wherewith the lover of beauty plainly refutes any Platonic achievement in the realm of esthetic knowledge. The analysis is less one of the criteria of beauty in the arts than of the inner dynamics which drive one to seek security and enduring happiness through esthetic experience alone. Broadly conceived, the extremes here tested relate to the Romantic emphases upon a general "exuberant joy of life" coupled with irony, concealment, social detachment, and intensive passion for the unique and novel. There is no attempt to erect a complicated hierarchy of the arts. Kierkegaard commences his discussion with "the musical erotic" simply because, for him, "the sensual genius is absolutely lyrical, and it comes to expression in music in all its lyrical impatience." Or, as he adds, "it is force, life, movement, constant unrest, perpetual succession; but this unrest, this succession, does not enrich it, it remains always the same, it does not unfold itself, but it storms uninterruptedly forward as if in a single breath" (Vol. I, p. 57). The selection of Mozart's *Don Juan* is important in that it represents the highest stage of "the musical erotic"—Mozart's full-toned, exuberant vigor embodies the seductive desire for the uniquely individual which is "irresistible and demoniac." Unlike the ideal psychical stability and faithfulness of Greek love, this desire vitalizes and enchants by a faithfulness only to the moment and its limited possibilities and a faithlessness towards the present in relation to the past and the future. Like the fabulous exploits of Don Juan, the sensuality of modern music has no genuine end but leads on indefinitely. Kierkegaard could hardly have intended this discussion as an adequate and final estimate of music. What he apparently meant was to record a motive in human life which finds its highest expression in a particular legend so handled esthetically as to foster extreme trust in that motive. Whether such was Mozart's intention, or whether critics agree on the point, is thereby, at least in part, irrelevant. However, it would not be irrelevant to ask whether such a motive is dominant in musical enjoyment. Is music altogether sensually erotic, can it only embody the attitude of momentary faithfulness to life, and has it never such significant form as is, in some sense, completed within itself and not forever unfinished? Here our author has his special bias—and, perhaps, his special limitations as an esthetic inquirer.

In the comparison of ancient with modern tragedy Kierkegaard

introduces some of his favorite themes, namely, the nature of guilt and anxiety in modern culture. What he calls the objectivity of ancient tragedy, resting upon "the substantial categories of state, family, and destiny," has, in modern drama, been largely replaced by a reflective subjectivity which tends to lift the hero not only out of his relation to state, race, and destiny but out of connection with his own preceding life. Thus:

> That which in the Greek sense affords the tragic interest [in Sophocles' *Antigone*], is that Oedipus' sorrowful destiny reechoes in the brother's unhappy destiny, in the sister's collision with a simple human prohibition; the tragic fate of Oedipus is, as it were, the after effects which ramify from a single branch of his family. This is the totality which makes the sorrow of the spectator so infinitely deep. It is not an individual who goes down, it is a small world, it is the objective sorrow, which, released, now advances in its own terrible consistency, like a force of nature, and Antigone's unhappy fate is but an echo of her father's, an intensified sorrow. When, therefore, Antigone in defiance of the king's prohibition resolves to bury her brother, we do not see in this so much a free action on her part as a predestined necessity, which visits the father's crime upon the children. [Vol. I, p. 127.]

The category of modern tragedy, however, is not this tragic sorrow which implies an element of guilt and tragic pain which implies an element of innocence, but rather an anxiety by means of which the subject appropriates his sorrow and assimilates it reflectively, thereby detaching himself from his social context and moving towards subjective isolation. Kierkegaard was striving to contrast the objectivity and contextual relatedness of the Greek tragic hero with the subjectivity and isolation of the modern tragic hero, such as Hamlet. "Hence," he says, "modern tragedy has no epic foreground, no epic heritage. The hero stands and falls entirely in his own acts." The resultant death of the modern tragic hero is relief from the truly tragic human anxiety which can find no resolution. Reflective grief, as Kierkegaard points out in a section entitled "Shadowgraphs," is a basic human sorrow restlessly seeking, but never finding, its object. The "failure" of modern man, we might say, is his inability to achieve psychic relatedness to himself (personal integration or maturity) and, thereby, his loss of full relatedness to others. The psychiatrist today would say that without love of self one can not love anyone else, and this entails a vicious and tragic circle of isolation from one's self and others.

The exclusive cult of the esthetic must end in ennui, unhappiness, isolation from fellow men, the elevation of the accidental to the position of an absolute, deception of others, and finally self-deception. Kierkegaard's style in the presentation of these results is an embodiment of the temperamental type which, up to this point, he has analyzed in terms of music and tragic drama. He

imagines himself a member of a society which must now cultivate the fruitless gardens of the esthete:

> . . . we whose activities, to conform with the sacred tradition of our society, are essays in the religion of the aphoristical and the accidental, who not merely think and speak aphoristically, but live aphoristically, we who live withdrawn and *segregati*, like aphorisms in life, without community of men, without sharing their griefs and their joys; we who are not consonantal sounds in the alarums of life, but solitary birds in the stillness of night, gathering together only occasionally, to be edified by considering the wretchedness of life, the length of day, and the endless permanence of time. . . . But the reward, aye, it is more glorious than any in the world, and more certain; for he who is assured that he is the unhappiest man, need fear no fate, he will not taste the humiliation in his last hour of having to cry: Solon, Solon, Solon! [Vol. I, pp. 179–180.]

The cult of sorrow is but one result, in Kierkegaard's mind, of that modern temper which conceives itself exclusively in esthetic categories. The subjectivity of modern life often has a degree of antisocial individualism:

> People talk so much about man being a social animal; at bottom he is a beast of prey, and the evidence for this is not confined to the shape of his teeth. [Vol. I, p. 236.]

The isolation and ennui of the individual has led to the cult of the irrelevant:

> The poet Baggesen says somewhere of someone that he was doubtless a good man, but that there was one insuperable objection against him, that there was no word that rhymed with his name. It is extremely wholesome thus to let the realities of life split upon an arbitrary interest. . . . The arbitrariness in oneself corresponds to the accidental in the external world. One should therefore always have an eye open for the accidental, always be *expeditus*, if anything should offer. [Vol. I, p. 246.]

This intensive subjectivity and isolation from natural, historical context leads to art as a final attempt to conceal one's self through intricate reflections wholly transcending the situation; deception becomes an art and all art finally deception:

> To keep those who listen in suspense, by means of small incidents of an episodic character, to ascertain what they wish the outcome to be, to trick them in the course of the narration—that is my delight; to make use of ambiguities, so that the listeners understand one thing in the saying, and then suddenly notice that the words could also be interpreted otherwise—that is my art. [Vol. I, p. 307. From "Diary of the Seducer."]

To Kierkegaard the esthetic way of life can not have the health within it which was the aim of the highest of Greek ideals. The very moralistic tone of Western Christianity has corrupted esthetic health, forced it to appear sensuous, restless, deceptive, a vain flight of the alone in search of self-sufficiency:

> If I once get a foothold in her chamber, I will take care of the banns myself. I have always sought to develop the beautiful Greek self-sufficiency, and especially to make a priest superfluous. [Vol. I, p. 345.]

The author has thus far analyzed, and portrayed in a semi-autobiographical fashion, a breakdown of the modern personality. That the failure of interpersonal relatedness and mental health hinges for him upon exclusive pursuit of the esthetic will certainly ruffle some critics, who believe that their artistic appreciation, far from manifesting neurotic trends of subjective self-destruction, actually orders or expresses order in their lives and helps relate them to their social context. Kierkegaard does not say that esthetic appreciation means the deterioration of the person, however; he is really presenting substantial reasons for decrying that attitude towards artistry which was to eventuate in "art for art's sake" and the resultant ivory tower motif permeating many a modern esthete. What recently has been criticized as "the transcendence of modern art"—its lack of acculturation and of insight into the social-moral issues of its context—is nearest to what Kierkegaard rejects. That this was his intention is clear from his descriptive analysis of the ethical way of life, which he claims alone has that insight into life which may draw forth the true conceptions of beauty. What he abhorred was that esthetic divorce from life which was a result of narcissism. The problem of modern Western culture was to regain the unity of the esthetic and the moral, and this involved nothing less than a reconstruction of the whole human personality.

It is interesting here—and, perhaps, important for some of us who have pigeon-holed Kierkegaard the theologian—to notice the humanism, the empiricism, the psychological realism with which he approaches the dynamics of the ethical life. As I suggested earlier, this is brought out most clearly in the section on the equilibrium of the esthetic and ethical in personality (Vol. II, pp. 131–278), to which the essay, "Aesthetic Validity of Marriage," is a literary transition and introduction. The initial criticism of the narcissistic esthete is lodged in terms of the external social-moral relations where the lack of genuine attachment to life produces a prime symptom—irresponsibility, or lack of human meaning in personal relationships. And, as Kierkegaard never tires of repeating, the cause of this is a failure of nerve in the estimation and understanding of one's self and others:

> Love is devotion, but devotion is only possible when I go out of myself. How, then, can this be combined with the lack of frankness which wishes precisely to remain in itself? "One loses," you say, "by thus revealing oneself." Yes, of course, that man always loses who profits by being secretive. But if you would be consistent, you must carry this much further, so that you must not only dissuade from marriage but from every closer approach to

people. . . . The true erotic art would be to make an impression at a distance, which would be exceedingly dangerous to the person concerned, precisely because it would be out of nothing she herself created her object and then fell in love with her own creation. But this is not love, it is the coquetry of the seducer. On the other hand, he who loves has lost himself and forgotten himself in the other; but in losing himself and forgetting himself in the other he is revealed to the other, and in forgetting himself he is remembered in the other. He who loves will not wish to be mistaken for another, whether it be a better or a more lowly man, and he who has not this reverence for himself and for the loved one does not love. Therefore secretiveness generally has its ground in a feeling of inferiority, one would like to add a cubit unto one's stature. [Vol. II, p. 92.]

While Kierkegaard has much else to say at the outset about the union of the particular and the universal, the sensual and the spiritual, in love, this statement stands out with stylistic directness and an immediacy grounded in experience whereby the reader has little difficulty in feeling his way into the heart of the author's problem.

Before passing to the final analysis of the reconstruction of personality one further emphasis in the conception of the genuinely esthetic should be mentioned. This concerns the relation of temporal elements within esthetic experiences. While the author here exhibits a certain Germanic quaintness in his arrangement of the particular arts and a flair for generalities which could endanger further inquiry, he reveals his highest criterion for the genuinely esthetic, and hence is worth extended quotation.

When one follows, either dialectically or historically, the development of the aesthetically beautiful, one will find that the direction of this movement is away from spatial determinants to those of time, and that the perfection of art depends upon the successive possibility of detaching oneself from space and orienting oneself towards time. In this consists the transition and the significance of the transition from sculpture to painting, as Schelling has recently pointed out. Music has time as its element, but it gains no permanent place in it; its significance lies in its constant vanishing in time; it emits sounds in time, but at once it vanishes and has no permanence. Finally, poetry is the highest of all arts and is therefore the art which knows best how to set off to advantage the significance of time. It does not need to confine itself to the moment the way painting does, neither does it vanish as music does, but nevertheless, it is compelled, as we have seen, to concentrate in the moment. Hence, it has limits, and (as was shown above) it cannot represent that which has its reality in temporal succession. And yet the fact that the significance of time is stressed does not decrease the aesthetic effect; on the contrary, the aesthetic ideal becomes richer and fuller in proportion as the importance of time is duly emphasized. How, then, can the aesthetic be represented, seeing that it is incommensurable even with poetry? Answer: by living it. It thereby acquires a resemblance to music, which *is* merely because it is constantly repeated, existing merely in the instant of execution. . . . In this way aesthetics is neutralized and reconciled with life; for though in one sense poetry and art are a reconciliation with life, yet in another sense

they are at enmity with it because they reconcile only one side of the soul. Here I have reached the highest concept of the aesthetic. [Vol. II, pp. 114–115.]

The art of life is, for Kierkegaard, the highest art and capable of greatest sublimation. But, as he says, this requires a courageous reconciliation with and possession of one's self, so that in the human drama one may feel himself at once poet, actor, and prompter in an historic rôle whose internal and external dimensions progressively attain a balance or harmony. Without this ultimately ethical perspective upon life, the stages of the esthetic life lead through attachment to physical and external conditions of enjoyment, the view that personality is determined by talents, the dread of the common man, Neronic melancholy, anxiety, despair of thought and action, an overpowering consciousness of the nullity of one's own existence, and finally a positive inability to accept the limited and conditioned character of one's life. The cure for this love of one's self which is but concealed hatred of life Kierkegaard propounds in terms of a basic acceptance of the self. He uses terms which, curiously enough, lead in two directions: a purely humanistic and non-religious psychotherapy, and a Christian understanding of guilt and grace. While later he is to view these as two separate stages, in the present work there is a loose relation between them which gives his views a certain free and spontaneous character. The first stage of therapy here is the ability to "repent" and to "choose one's self," whereby alone man may return to the validity of his own existence and to a specific relatedness to family, race, and—God. This latter trilogy was presented earlier, in the discussion of Greek tragedy, as family, race or state, and destiny. Throughout *Either/Or* I can not find that the Christian "God" means anything more to Kierkegaard than destiny meant to the Greek. His aim throughout appears to be to reëstablish the Greek ideal of the unity of the moral and the esthetic, concretely envisaged under the various conceptions of *moira*. But it should be added that he already asserts that "in Christianity repentance found for the first time its true expression." He was on his way to becoming a Protestant psychologist.

The concept of self-acceptance as the condition of a spontaneous, creative personality, a concept which Kierkegaard describes in terms of "choosing one's self," and its ethical implications are, in many ways, the most significant contribution made in the work. Here, if anywhere, Kierkegaard may be regarded as one of the many forerunners of present psychotherapeutic theory. It is also here that his empiricism comes to the fore. While his statements are often elliptic, it is clear enough that his translation of the

Socratic-Platonic "know thyself" into "choose thyself" involves an intellectual and emotional acceptance or love of one's self leading to the kind of knowledge which yields stability of thought and action in an interpersonal context. The problem of good and evil is thus set in terms of the good and bad personality, and, ultimately, like Aristotle, Kierkegaard says that the good is what the good man chooses. The two criteria for the good man would seem to be, roughly, internal stability or self-sufficiency and external stability or the ability to realize the self most fully in social relationships. Kierkegaard's expression of these points stands out with marked clarity and brevity.

> He . . . who chooses himself ethically chooses himself concretely as this definite individual, and he attains this concretion by the fact that this act of choice is identical with this act of repentance which sanctions the choice. The individual thus becomes conscious of himself as this definite individual, with these talents, these dispositions, these instincts, these passions, influenced by these definite surroundings, as this definite product of a definite environment. But being conscious of himself in this way, he assumes responsibility for all this. . . . At the instant of choice he is in the most complete isolation, for he withdraws from the surroundings, and the same moment he is in absolute continuity, for he chooses himself as product, and this choice is the choice of freedom, so that when he chooses himself as product he can just as well be said to produce himself. . . . As product he is pressed into the forms of reality, in the choice he makes himself elastic, transforming all the outwardness into inwardness. . . . He who lives aesthetically sees only possibilities everywhere, they constitute for him the content of the future, whereas he who lives ethically sees tasks everywhere. . . . This gives the ethical individual a sense of assurance which he who lives merely aesthetically lacks entirely. He who lives aesthetically expects everything from without. . . . He who lives ethically has always a way of escape when everything goes against him; when the storm broods over him so darkly that his neighbor cannot see him, he nevertheless has not perished, there is always a point he holds fast—his self. . . . This self which is the aim is not merely a personal self but a social, a civic self. . . . From the personal life he translates himself into the civic, and from this into the personal. The personal life as such was an isolation and hence imperfect; in the fact that through the civic life he comes back into his personality the personal life manifests itself in a higher form. [Vol. II, pp. 210–212, 220.]

The reader may reflect that some of these statements remind one of similar elements in the philosophy of Kierkegaard's day, especially of Schelling, and, to a lesser extent, of Hegel. But Kierkegaard puts them in a way which eradicates the entire speculative function of German idealism, much of the language of which, at least, Schelling retained to the bitter end in his search for a "metaphysical empiricism." The health of the personality begins when one learns the limits and conditions of free choice in his concrete situation; the cure is accompanied by the affirmation of the self as

integral and related to others. Had this general conception been more popular in Kierkegaard's own day, psychiatry might have been saved such a long retreat in the last two decades from some of the biological determinism of Freud.

Kierkegaard returns, towards the conclusion of the work, to his quest for the unity of the esthetic and the ethical. Genuine beauty —one may judge that he means in the arts as in life—is the expression of man's insight into his own personality in its particular context. Art is moral when it reveals the intentions of the self to the self and its participation in its environment:

> The individual has his teleology in himself. . . . This self, however, is not an abstraction but is absolutely concrete. . . . His self must be opened in due relation to his entire concretion; but to this concretion belong also the factors which are designed for taking an active part in the world. So his movement, then, is from himself through the world to himself. Here the movement is a real movement, for it is a work of freedom, but at the same time it is immanent teleology, and hence it is here only there can be any question of beauty. . . . The ethical thesis that every man has a calling is the expression for the fact that there is a rational order of things in which every man, if he will, fills his place in such a way that he expresses at once the universal-human and the individual. With this way of regarding it has existence become less beautiful? One has no occasion to rejoice in an aristocracy which is founded upon an accident and accidentally founded upon it; no, one has a realm of gods. [Vol. II, pp. 229–230, 244.]

In these terms love and friendship contain their intrinsic beauties, their revelations of man to man. Upon this clarity of man to himself depend all further problems in the moral sphere. Thus, like Aristotle, Kierkegaard would base all justice upon the inter-personal level of friendship, the social sense, rather than upon the abstract concept of duty.

We may conclude, then, that in Kierkegaard's analysis of personality is to be found a singularly humanistic approach to art and morals. In contrast to the usual assumption that he was solely concerned with a narrowly Christian, not to say dogmatic, theological approach to human nature, the reader of *Either/Or* may be both amazed and, at times, delighted to recognize in this youthful work a sensitive humanism, anti-speculative empiricism, and psychological realism which justify a consideration of the work as contributive to many present perspectives in art, morals, and the understanding of personality. Kierkegaard realized, as few have been privileged to know, that beauty, goodness, and self-understanding have a real as well as ideal relationship and that poverty in one must mean ruin in all.

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NOTES AND NEWS

TO THE EDITORS OF THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY:

Beginning in 1945 Columbia University and the University of California at Berkeley will require for the Ph.D. in Philosophy an M.A. or the equivalent in some field outside the regular philosophical field.[1] This was done simultaneously by the two universities and it is hoped that the movement will extend to other institutions. The University of Chicago has arrangements that approximate the same result, and the philosophy departments in some other universities are, I understand, contemplating changes in the same direction.

The aim of the new requirement is to produce a double effect; first, to fertilize the field of philosophy by intimate contact with the materials of other fields, and, second, if possible, to fertilize other fields by contact with philosophy. The first effect was our more immediate concern, since it is within our direct control and should show its results fairly quickly, but it may well be that in the long run the second effect will be the more important.

The primary motive, however, was to achieve the first effect. It appeared rather noticeable that those who received a doctor's degree in philosophy and had for some reason an interest in some other subject were on the whole the outstanding men in the philosophical field in later years. Moreover, the two departments named were disturbed about a tendency for studies within the philosophical field to become over technical and sterile unless they are kept constantly in touch with fresh materials from outside sources. Great stress in the training of our graduate students is necessarily and properly laid on logic

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[1] The Columbia University statement: "*Practical Competence in Another Field of Study.* Philosophy is intimately related to the humanities and sciences, and students of philosophy are expected to cultivate these interrelations, as well as to bring to their philosophical studies the advantages gained from specialized disciplines and scientific training. Unless individual circumstances make the requirement inadvisable, candidates for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy are expected to have competence in some other recognized academic subject matter beyond the technical disciplines of philosophy before they are admitted to the final oral examination. The degree of competence required is that a candidate be familiar with the general scope and problems of the field and be able to follow its literature with critical understanding. Degrees such as M.A., LL.B., B.D., and S.T.M. may be accepted as evidence of such competence. This requirement is intended to be an addition to, and not a substitute for, the normal program of studies in philosophy, and is related to similar requirements that are being adopted by the philosophy departments of some other universities." *Columbia University, Bulletin of Information, Department of Philosophy,* May, 1944.

The University of California at Berkeley statement: "Beginning with July 1, 1945, all students proposing to present philosophy as a field of study for the doctor's degree must satisfy two requirements. (1) They must pass written qualifying examinations in philosophy. . . . (2) They must be able to show competence in a field of study other than philosophy, chosen with the consent of the committee, such competence being ordinarily indicated by a year's graduate work in that field as demanded for a master's degree or its equivalent. The field of study other than philosophy is to be chosen from fields included in the physical sciences, the biological sciences, the social sciences, mathematics, the fine arts, and philology and literature."

and the history of philosophy. These are philosophers' tools. Some students may make these the object of their life study. But there is need that the materials which these tools can work upon should be stressed equally with the tools. We believe our new requirement will have this desired result.

The urgency for developing men of a broader competency than our present training of philosophers produces on the average is brought out at one point by the movement to set up general courses in the humanities. It appears that the men wanted as instructors in these courses are men of breadth of knowledge, judgment, and critical insight, just such men as have traditionally been regarded as philosophers. The question arises whether the strength of this phase of the humanities movement is not a result of the failure of philosophy departments to keep sufficiently in touch with changes that have been going on about them in other fields of knowledge. The natural training ground for men competent to offer such humanities courses is within philosophy departments where there is an established and essentially sound tradition of human judgment and criticism and synthesis. Rather than try to break in a new set of teachers in the humanities to do a philosophical job without the philosophical tradition, why not extend the range of philosophical training from the center of its long-tried and established tradition? Foundations interested in the humanities may find that one of the most effective uses they can make of their funds would be to encourage and assist the development of such an enriched training of teachers of philosophy as the new requirement is expected to bring about. A philosophy department with men of diverse specialties in art, history, and science, would be able collectively to give the well proportioned view of our world which many humanities programs seek to attain.

If foundations could assist by grants-in-aid or other similar means in supporting promising graduate students during the added time which the new requirement makes necessary for the attainment of the doctor's degree, this would go far towards answering the only serious objection to the new regulation that is raised. Since there is practically no reduction in the old requirements for a Ph.D. in philosophy, the addition of an M.A. or equivalent in an outside field brings it about that the least amount of extra time that could be anticipated in getting the doctorate would be a year. Even this assumes that the student has already been preparing himself for the M.A. during his undergraduate days. Four years after the A.B. would then be the shortest time in which a doctor's degree could be expected.

We do not believe that the regular philosophical training should be more than slightly modified since we desire to retain at full vigor the critical power which this training has proved it can give. Nor do we desire to reduce the outside discipline below a degree of recognized professional competence. We do not think the old "minor" in another field meant enough. We wish the student to have gone far enough in the outside field to gain the respect and to talk the language of the experts in that field. And this means nothing less than the M.A. which those experts themselves set up or an equivalent which they would respect.

But even if no immediate aid were forthcoming to compensate for the extra year, we believe that the effectiveness the students will gain from the outside special competency will be worth the time spent. As better philosophers, they should in the end command better salaries than those less well trained. Moreover, in conditions of stress, they have another subject they can teach. In purely financial terms, the students may, in the long run, come

out ahead. But certainly philosophy as a whole will come out ahead, and be able to have a much larger amount of direct influence on other fields that could profit from an infusion of philosophy. Certain of these fields which are now with some justification fearful or scornful of philosophical criticism applied to their methods and results may then gradually be weaned away from these attitudes. At times this result may occur without the philosophical source at first becoming known. For no doubt a good many philosophy students working in their special field in fulfillment of the requirement for their doctor's degree will turn into the special field of their choice and take their doctorate there, and thus carry the equivalent of an M.A. or more of philosophy into the field of the specialty instead of the other way round.

For years a number of us at Berkeley have unofficially urged philosophy students to seek an outside specialty. As a general thing the students have not felt they could afford to take the time. And after they have received the degree, there is usually a let-down, and the worry about getting a job sets in if an opening does not immediately turn up. Persuasion alone does not often work in this matter. But on at least one occasion it worked: a student, who after a year's graduate study in philosophy received a fellowship, specialized the next year on our advice in social studies at Chicago, and then never came back from that field. We felt that was a good thing. For we believe it unlikely that other branches of study will seek philosophy, but if they absorb philosophically trained men, the result is just as good.

It is doubtful if either the Columbia University department or that of the University of California at Berkeley would have risked the new requirement without the support of the other. But each department gave the other courage to follow its convictions. We hope the courage we have given each other may encourage others.

We also hope that foundations and donors and university administrations may sense the educational and social implications of our move and by special fellowships or otherwise may lend their assistance to promising students seeking to realize our goal of drawing the departments of knowledge more closely together.

STEPHEN C. PEPPER

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